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TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OF LOCAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS
CHARLES

M.

KNHIER*

The common law principle of limited territorial jurisdiction has
been extended to local law enforcement officers in the United States.
At common law the territorial jurisdiction of the sheriff was limited
to the county.' When an arrest was made on a warrant, it was necessary that it be made within the jurisdiction of the officer making it.
In case, h6wever, a felony was committed, it was the duty of the
sheriff "to raise the hue and cry and thus pursue the criminal into
any other jurisdiction and there arrest him." This power was limited
to cases of felony, no such right of pursuit existing in cases of misdemeanors. 2 And if a prisoner escaped "and fly into another county,
the sheriff or his officers, upon fresh suit, may take him again in
another county."3
These common law principles have been applied to local law enforcement officers in the United States. In the absence of statutory
provision, sheriffs, constables, marshals and police have no jurisdiction beyond the territorial boundaries of the area for which they
have been selected. When acting beyond the boundaries of their
jurisdiction they are treated as private persons acting without legal
process. Their territorial jurisdiction may, however, be extended by
statutory provision.
Jurisdictionof Sheriffs and Constables.
In the absence of statutory provisions, "the power of a sheriff is
limited to his own county. He is to be adjudged a sheriff in his own
county and not elsewhere. ' 4 It has been held that where a sheriff of
* Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Illinois.
'Gregson v. Heather, 2 Ld. Raym. 1455 (1726), s. c. 2 Strange 727; Devanage v. Dalby, 1 Douglas 383 (1780); Webber v. Manning, 1 Dowl. P. C. 24
(1831); Thompson v. Burton, 1 Dowl. P. C. 428 (1832); Lloyd v. Smith, 1
Dowl. P. C. 372 (1832); Boynton's Case, 3 Co. 43 (1592); Ridgway's Case,
3 Co. 52 (1594).
'2 Hale's P. C. 115 (1800); Butolph v. Blust, 5 Lans. 84 (N. Y. 1871).
1BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, 415; R. C. SEWELL, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF SHERIFF (1845), 73. See also W. H. WATSON, THE LAW RELATING
TO THE OFFcE AND DUTY OF SHERIFF (1834) ; T. G. CROCKn, THE DUTIES OF
SHERIFFS (1890); B. D. SmITH, THE POWER, DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF
SHERIFFS, CORONERS AND CONSTABLEs (1883).
'Page v. Staples, 13 R. I. 306 (1881). Also see: Washoe Co. v. Humboldt
Co., 14 Nev. 123 (1879); Gardner v. Jenkins, 14 Md. 58 (1859); Evans and
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one county went into another county to arrest a person charged with
crime in his county he "had no more authority there to make arrests
than any other private citizen had, and consequently no more right
to carry a weapon concealed than any other private citizen had."
The sheriff in this case was held not to be in pursuit of escaped
offenders, within the meaning of the laws of the state, but had simply
heard that parties for whom he had warrants were in the other
county. 5
The Court of Appeals of Texas held that it was reversible error
in a trial for the murder of a law enforcement officer, who was making an arrest beyond his territorial jurisdiction, not to instruct the
jury that the attempted arrest was unlawful. This information
should, according to the court, have been given to the jury in determining whether the defendant was guilty, and if so, of what grade of
offense. 6 In making an arrest beyond the boundaries of his county
7
the sheriff is acting as a private citizen.
The Supreme Court of Missouri, however, has upheld the arrest
by a sheriff of one county made in another county, even though the
warrant was addressed to the sheriff commanding him to arrest the
man "if he be found in your county." Since this was a habeas corpus
proceeding the court held that "such a claim, even if supported,"
would be of no avail as the question as to how the officer obtained
custody "would not be a proper matter of inquiry in this proceeding."8 In such a case the court will not look into the legality of the
arrest but only into the legality of the detention. 9
A sheriff may, "upon fresh pursuit, retake a prisoner who has escaped from his custody into another county."' 0 If the original arrest
was upon a writ, the jurisdiction to which it extended is of no consideration, "for he retakes him, not by that writ, but by virtue of the
hold he had on him by the arrest."" It has been held, however, that
Love v. Wait, 5 J. J. Marsh 110 (Ky. 1830); York v. Commonwealth, 82 Ky.
360 (1884) ; Benson v. Smith, 42 Me. 414, 66 Am. DEc. 285 (1856) ; Cunningham v. County of San Joaquim, 49 Cal. 323 (1874); Sturm v. Potter, 41 Ind.
181 (1872).
Shirley v. State, 100 Miss. 799, 57 So. 221 (1912).
'Jones v. State, 26 Tex. App. 1, 9 S. W. 53 (1888).
'McCaslin v. McCord, 116 Tenn. 690, 94 S. W. 79 (1906).
'Schwartz v. Dutro, 298 S. W. 769 (Mo. 1927).
'Ex parte Barker, 87 Ala. 4, 6 So. 7 (1889).
"Page v. Staples, supra note 4; Howard v. Lyon, 1 Root 107 (Conn.
1879). Cf. Burlingham v. Wylee, 2 Root 152 (Conn. 1794).
1Pearl v. Rawdin, 5 Day 244 (Conn. 1812). Cf. Cooper v. Adams, 2
Blackf. 294 (Ind. 1830).
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a sheriff could not pursue and retake in another state a prisoner who
2
had escaped from his custody, on civil process.'
Since "a sheriff is an officer of the county, and in the absence of
express provision his powers do not go beyond the territorial limits
of his county," he may not go into another county and levy an attachment upon or take by writ of replevin goods or property situated in the other county. 13 If a sheriff levies on and sells a tract of
land, only a part of which lies in his county, the deed conveys only
the land lying in his county.' 4 And a sheriff's sale of personal property not then within the county would convey no title. 15
As a sheriff has no jurisdiction in another county, neither does
he have any authority in another state. The Supreme Court of New
York has held that when the sheriff of a Pennsylvania county came
into New York with a bench warrant issued to him as sheriff, upon
an indictment found in the county, he was not authorized to make
an arrest and carry the person back to Pennsylvania. The court
stated that "In respect to those acts he is to be treated as a private
person acting without legal process.""' And where a deputy sheriff
of Oklahoma, under a warrant issued by a court in that state, arrested a person in the state of Kansas it was held to be unlawful and
to constitute duress.1
Constables are usually selected for a district smaller than a
county. In several states, however, they have been held to have
jurisdiction throughout the county.' s This is based, in most states,
"Bromley V. Hutchins, 8 Vt. 194, 30 Am. DEc. 465 (1836). Also see:
Dick v. Bailey, 2 La. Ann. 974, 46 Am. DEc. 465 (1847) ; Brownell v. Manchester, 1 Pick. 233 (Mass. 1822).
"Morrell v. Ingle, 23 Kan. 32 (1879); Dederick v. Brandt, 16 Ind. App.
264, 44 N. E. 1010 (1896) ; Jones v. Baxter, 146 Ala. 620, 41 So. 781 (1906) ;
Whitworth v. Wing, 125 S. C. 146, 118 S. E. 177 (1923) ; Dinkgrave v. Sloan,
13 La. Ann. 393 (1858).
"Finley v. South Carolina Canal and R. R. Co., 2 Rich. 567 (S. C. 1846);
Alfred v. Montague, 26 Texas 732, 84 Am. DEC. 603 (1863).
"Baker v. Casey, 19 Mich. 220 (1869).
" Mandeville v. Guernsey, 51 Barb. 99 (N. Y. 1865). Cf. Nicholls v. Ingersoll, 7 Johns. Rep. 145 (N. Y. 1810).
" Stuart v. Mayberry, 105 Okla. 13, 231 Pac. 491 (1924).
" Sullivan v. Wentworth, 137 Mass. 233 (1884); Cundiff v. Teague, 46
Tex. 475 (1877); Dade v. Morris, 7 N. C. 146 (1819); Commonwealth v.
Hughes, 10 B. Mon. 461 (Ky. 1850) ; Norris v. Mayor of Smithville, 1 Swan
164 (Tenn. 1851); M'Neale v. Clarke, 3 Gratt. 299 (Va. 1846); Henry v.
Waldrop, 206 Ala. 135, 89 So. 371 (1921) ; Medlin v. Seideman, 39 Tex. Civ.
App. 553, 88 S. W. 250 (1905) ; Texas Land and Immigration Co. v. Masterson, 11 Tex. Civ. App. 483, 33 S. W. 376 (1895); Lapsley v. Georgia
Loan, Savings and Banking Co., 99 Ga. 370, 27 S. E. 717 (1896) ; Davis v.
Sanderlin, 119 N. C. 84, 25 S. E. 815 (1896); Allor v. Board of Auditors of
Wayne Co., 43 Mich. 76, 4 N. W. 492 (1880). Cf. Upper Appomattox Co. v.
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on statutory provisions. In other states their jurisdiction has been
held to be limited to the city, town, township or other district for
which they are selected. 19 As in the case of the sheriff, a constable
has no jurisdiction beyond his own county; when he crosses the
20
boundary he assumes the status of a private citizen.
Jurisdictionof Police and Marshals.
It is the general holding of the courts that "in the absence of any
statute conferring the power, that municipal officers, such as marshals
and policemen, have no official power to apprehend offenders beyond
the boundaries of their municipalities." 2 1 The Supreme Court of
North Carolina has upheld a verdict of two hundred dollars damages
for arrest in such case; 22 and the Supreme Court of Wisconsin has
upheld a verdict for seven hundred and fifty dollars under similar
23
circumstances.
As has been pointed out above, at common law an officer could
pursue an offender beyond the boundaries of his jurisdiction in case
of felony, but not in the case of a misdemeanor. The Court of Appeals of New York has held that under this principle a police officer
may not pursue a man outside the city limits and arrest him for a
misdemeanor committed within the city.24 The Supreme Court of
North Carolina has held that where police officers attempted to arrest a man for "loud and profane wearing," and he resisted and
escaped with their "billies," they had no right to pursue him beyond
the town limits in order to arrest him. The court took the view that
"when the prisoner had escaped from the custody of the officer, he
certainly had no more power or authority to arrest him than he had
Buffaloe, 121 N. C. 37, 27 S. E. 999 (1897) ; State v. Sigman, 106 N. C. 728,
11 S. E. 520 (1890) ; Lafontaine v. Greene, 17 Cal. 294 (1861); Lowe v. Alexander, 15 Cal. 296 (1860).

"Lawson v. Buzines, 3 Harr. 416 (Del. 1842); Divine v. Bailey, 62 Ga.

235 (1879); Riley v. James, 73 Miss. 1, 18 So. 930 (1895).
"Ledbetter v. State, 23 Tex. App. 247, 5 S. W. 226 (1887); Kindred v.
Stitt, 51 Ill. 401 (1869) ; Copeland v. Islay, 19 N. C. 505 (1837). Cf. Krug v.
Ward, 75 Ill. 603 (1875); Allen v. Napa County, 82 Cal. 187 (1889); Dix v.
Batchelder, 55 Vt. 562 (1883).

"Rodgers v. Schroeder, 287 S. W. 861 (Mo. 1926). Also see: It re Hotch-

kis, 6 D. C. Rep. 168 (1866); Holder v. St. Louis and S. F. R. Co., 155 Mo.
App. 664, 135 S. W. 507 (1911) ; Loewer's Gambrinus Brewing Co. v. Lithauer,

73 N. Y. Supp. 947 (1901); Tausend v. Handlear, 68 N. Y. Supp. 77 (1901).
Cf. Commonwealth v. Martin, 98 Mass. 4 (1867).

'Martin v. Houck, 141 N. C. 317, 54 S. E. 291 (1906).
"Karney v. Body, 186 Wis. 594, 203 N. W. 371 (1925).
'

Butolph v. Blust, 41 How. Pr. 481 (N. Y. 1871).
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when the original arrest was made, and his power in the latter case
'25
could only be exercised within the town limits.
A case was before the Court of Appeals of Kentucky in 1914
where a prisoner who had been arrested in Kentucky, in order to
defeat arrest, forcibly carried the officer across the state line into
Tennessee. The question in this case was as to whether he continued to be a prisoner. While across the line in Tennessee the prisoner
was shot by a brother of the arresting officer, and the widow was
suing the marshal and his bondsmen for failure to give protection to
the prisoner. They defended on the grounds that when they crossed
the line and got beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the town, his
authority ceased and he was no longer acting in his official capacity.
The court emphasized the fact that the prisoner had already- been
arrested before leaving the town in which the marshal had authority,
and held that even though they had crossed the town line he was still
in lawful custody 28
Several states by statutes authorize law enforcement officers
from whom persons who have been arrested, escape or are rescued,
to immediately pursue and retake them at any time and in any place
in the state 2 7 The Supreme Court of Tennessee has held that where
the statute authorized an officer from whose custody an arrested person had escaped to "immediately pursue and retake him, at any time
and in any place within the state," this does not authorize an officer
to arrest without a warrant, a person who "has escaped from jail or
from custody when the pursuit is not immediate or fresh." 28 The
Supreme Court of Mississippi has also held that a similar statute of
that state did not authorize a deputy sheriff to go into another county
after hearing that such person was there. This was not a case of hot
pursuit and the conviction of the officer for carrying concealed
29
weapons in the other county was upheld.
Sossamon v. Cruse, 133 N. C. 470, 45 S. E. 757 (1903).

Bowlin v. Archer, 157 Ky. 540, 163 S. W. 477 (1914).

REv. LAWS (1921) §2482; Omz. LAws (Olson, 1920) §1770; IOwA
CODE (1927) §13477; KAN. Rsv. STAT. ANN. (1923) §§ 62-1205; MINN. STAT.
(Mason, 1927) §10575; UTAH LAWS (1917) §8732; Miss. ANN. CODE (Hemingway, 1927) §1267; IND. ANN. STAT. (Bums, 1926) §2160; NEv. REv. LAWS
(1912) §6968; MoNT.REv. CODES (Choate, 1921) §11771; IDAHO Coup. STAT.
'OFA.

(1919) §8741; S. D. Rzv. CODE (1919) §4566; TENN. ANN. CODE (Co. Ed.,
1918) §7006. See also TEAx. REv. CGIm. STAT. (1925) p. 38, art. 244.

= McCaslin v. McCord, supra note 7.
'Miss.
ANN. CODE (Hemingway, 1927)
note 5.

§1272; Shirley v. State, supra
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The jurisdiction of local officers has in some cases been extended
by statute. As has been pointed out above, in some states, constables
have by statute been given jurisdiction throughout the county. 80 The
jurisdiction of city police and of town and village marshals has also
been extended in some cases beyond the territorial boundaries of the
town or village. 31 This is usually extended in such cases to cover
the county. Policemen in South Dakota possess within the corporate
limits of the municipality, and within one mile beyond, the powers of
constables. They were also given authority "to pursue and arrest
any person fleeing from justice, in any part of the state."8 2 Police
in Connecticut may, with the consent of the authority to which they
are subject, and while acting under authority of the superintendent
of state police, go into any part of the state.83
The laws of Iowa provide that when a public offense is committed on the boundary line of two counties, or within five hundred
yards thereof, the jurisdiction is within either county.8 4 Under this
statute the Supreme Court of the state has upheld the arrest by a
constable of one county for an offense committed within and while
the defendant was in the other county. 3 5
Some courts place a strict interpretation upon statutes extending
the jurisdiction of local law enforcement officers. The laws of
Georgia provide that "an arresting officer may arrest any person
charged with crime, under a warrant issued by a judicial officer in
any county of the state, without regard to the residence of said arresting officer." In upholding a conviction of a police officer for
false imprisonment, where an arrest was made in another county, the
Court of Appeals of Georgia said: "This was evidently intended to
embrace such officers only as are authorized under the state law to
execute warrants, and was not intended to embrace such officers as
"°Supra note 18.

See also:

IND. ANN.

STAT.

(Burns, 1926)§§1995 and

12018; DEL. Rzv. CoDE (1915) §1412; OKLA. CoMP. STAT. (1921) P445;
Wyo. ComP. STAT. ANN. (1920) §6660; Ky. STAT. (Carroll, 1926) §440; AIuC.
DIG. STAT. (Crawford and Moses, 1921) §1448.
ComP. LAws (1921) §9039; MIcH. ComP. LAws (Cahill, 1915)
'CoLo.
§2954; TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. (1925) §§998-9; State v. Woodard, 144 La. 845,
81 So. 337 (1919) ; Williams v. State, 44 Ala. 41 (1870) ; Newburn v. Durham, 88 Tex. 288, 31 S. W. 195 (1895) ; s. c. 32 S. W. 112 (1895) ; Dudley v.
Janes, 6 Tex. Civ. App. 466, 26 S. W. 445 (1894).
2S. D. Rzv. CoDE (1919) §6301.
CONN. GEN. STAT. (1918) §2271.
"IOWA CODE (1927) §13452.
" State v. Seery, 64 N. W. 631 (1895) ; State v. Niers, 87 Ia. 725, 54 N. W.
1076 (1893) ; Floyd Co. v. Cerro Gordo Co., 47 Ia. 186 (1877).
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were constituted arresting officers by virtue of the laws of a municipality." 6
The St. Louis Court of Appeals has stated that statutes authorizing municipal law enforcement officers "to make arrests upon view
and without process, being in derogation of liberty, are strictly construed." The laws of the state provided that a city marshal should
have the power to serve and execute all warrants or other process
issued by the police judge of the city "at any place within the limits
of the county." The court upheld a verdict for five hundred dollars
damages against a marshal for pursuing a car beyond the city limits
for failure to make a boulevard stop. The court held that there was
nothing in the statute from which such power could be implied and
stated that: "The power of such officers to arrest without process
for mere quasi criminal offenses arising from the violation of ordinances is liable to serious abuses, and ought not to be enlarged by
judicial construction beyond what is expressely granted or necessarily implied in the statute." 3 7 The court emphasized the fact that
the offense here was not a felony.
It has been held that the police of St. Louis may arrest in any
part of the state for an offense committed within the city. They may
not, however, arrest in St. Louis County for offenses committed
within the county but outside the city. To uphold the right of the
police to go outside the city and make arrests in such case, would,
according to the Supreme Court of Missouri, be "to absolutely ignore all the principles of local self government." The court was here
interpreting the laws providing for the state controlled police system
of St. Louis. 88
It is a generally accepted principle that a warrant of arrest may
not be executed beyond the boundaries of the county in which the
officer issuing it resides. 89 Several states, however, by statute, authorize an officer holding a warrant to pursue and arrest the person
named in any county of the state. In some cases such statutes apply
only to the sheriff, but in most states to any officer in whose hands
the warrant of arrest is placed. For the purpose of apprehending
" Coker v. State, 14 Ga. App. 606, 81 S.E. 818 (1914).
" Rodgers v. Schroeder, supra note 21.

"State v. Stobie, 194 Mo. 14, 92 S. W. 191 (1906).
' Ex parte Crawford, 148 Wash. 265, 268 Pac. 871 (1928) ; Moak v. De

Forrest, 5 Hill 605 (N. Y. 1843); Young v. State, 117 So. 3 (Ala. 1928);
Knight v. Miles, 308 Mo. 538, 272 S.W. 922 (1925) ; George v. N. & W. R. R.
Co., 78 W. Va. 345, 88 S.E. 1036 (1916). Cf. Carpenter v. Lord, 88 Ore. 128,

171 Pac. 577 (1918).
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the party and serving the warrant, such officer may exercise the same
40
authority as in his own county.
Some states provide that such warrant must be indorsed by a
magistrate of the county in which the prisoner escapes; "thereupon
the person may be arrested in such county by the person bringing
such warrant." 4 ' In Indiana before the officer holding the warrant
pursues the accused into another county, he must have a certificate of
the county clerk attached thereto, stating that the justice of the peace
or city judge signing the warrant was duly commissioned and
42
qualified.
Conclusion.
The courts have followed the common law principle of limited
territorial jurisdiction for local law enforcement officers. Though
selected by the local areas, as counties, cities and towns, such officers
are engaged primarily in the enforcement of state law. And when
suit is brought against such local area for the torts of these officers
the courts follow the principle of non-liability on the grounds that
such officers are acting in a governmental capacity, and are, in brief,
agents of the state. Following this line of reasoning, local law enforcement officers, as agents of the state, might well be given a more
extensive territorial jurisdiction. Law enforcement is no longer a
localized problem. There are practical benefits to be derived from
an extension of the jurisdiction of such local officers. To prevent
conflict of authority this might well be subject to certain limitations.
But with proper safeguards it seem that such extension would be desirable. This might be accomplished by the abandonment by the
courts of the old common law principle; or it might be secured by
statutory enactment, as has already been done in several states. The
latter method seems to offer greater possibilities of securing the
change.
' OHIo GEN. CODE (Page, 1926) §13502; VA. CODE ANN. (1924) §4825;
Wis. STAT. (1927) §361.03; ARK. DIG. STAT. (Crawford and Moses, 1921)
§§513 and 562; Wyo. ComP. STAT. ANN. (1920) §7347; WAsH. COMp. STAT.
(Remington, 1922) §1950; ILL. REV. STAT. (Cahill, 1929) c. 38, §694; MONT.
REv. CODES (Choate, 1921) §§11737-8; TEX. REv. CRIM. STAT. (1925) p. 36, art.
223; W. VA. CODE ANN. (Barnes, 1923) §2792; UTAH LAWS (1917) §§8692-4;
MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) §§10575-8; ME. REV. STAT. (1916) c. 135, §5. See
also: Nadeau v. Conn., 142 Wash. 243, 252 Pac. 913 (1927) ; Ressler v. Peats,
86 Ill.
275 (1877) ; Little v. Rich, 55 Tex. Civ. App. 326, 118 S. W. 1077 (1909).
"Mo. REv. STAT. (1919) §3815; ALA. CODE (1923) §3273; Coleman v. State,

63 Ala. 93 (1879).
'IND. ANN. STAT. (Burns, 1926) §2092.

